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ABSTRACT 36 
Language’s intentional nature has been highlighted as a crucial feature distinguishing it from other 37 
communication systems. Specifically, language is often thought to depend on highly structured 38 
intentional action and mutual mindreading by a communicator and recipient. Whilst similar abilities in 39 
animals can shed light on the evolution of intentionality, they remain challenging to detect 40 
unambiguously. We revisit animal intentional communication and suggest that progress in identifying 41 
analogous capacities has been complicated by (i) the assumption that intentional (that is, voluntary) 42 
production of communicative acts requires mental-state attribution, and (ii) variation in approaches 43 
investigating communication across sensory modalities. To move forward, we argue that a framework 44 
fusing research across modalities and species is required. We structure intentional communication into 45 
a series of requirements, each of which can be operationalised, investigated empirically, and must be 46 
met for purposive, intentionally communicative acts to be demonstrated. Our unified approach helps 47 
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elucidate the distribution of animal intentional communication and subsequently serves to clarify what 48 
is meant by attributions of intentional communication in animals and humans. 49 
 50 
Key words: communication, language evolution, intentionality, vocalisation, gesture. 51 
 52 
CONTENTS 53 
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IV. Conclusions 57 
V. Acknowledgements 58 
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 60 
I. INTRODUCTION 61 
Language is considered to be one of the pinnacles of human biological evolution (Fitch, 2010). Its 62 
emergence in the Homo lineage was presumably enabled by the presence of a set of cognitive abilities 63 
and ecological conditions not shared by other species. One candidate for these abilities is the capacity 64 
to act with, and understand, communicative intentions. The philosopher of language, Paul Grice (1957, 65 
1982), was pivotal in highlighting the importance of such a psychological framework for 66 
communication and many authors working in the ‘Gricean’ tradition have followed him in arguing 67 
that the ability for intentional communication requires a sophisticated, pre-existing, metapsychological 68 
framework in which speaker and hearer (or signaller and receiver) mutually understand one another’s 69 
intentions and beliefs (Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Sperber, 2000; Tomasello, 2008; Scott-Phillips, 70 
2015b). 71 
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Within Grice’s influential analysis of speaker meaning there exist three clauses (Strawson, 1964; 72 
Jacob, 1997), the conjunction of which form the basis for Grice’s theory of communication. For a 73 
signaller, S, to mean something via utterance x requires that: (i) S intends that S’s utterance of x 74 
induces a response, r, in receiver, R; (ii) S intends that R recognises that S has intention (i), and (iii) S 75 
intends that R’s recognition of S’s intention functions at least partly in the motivation for R’s response, 76 
r. By this account, we not only intend to influence the receiver (through the production of a stimulus) 77 
when communicating, we also want them to recognise that we are acting with such intentions, and 78 
respond on the basis of recognising this. In linguistic pragmatics this communication of intention 79 
(surmised by these three clauses) is often referred to as ostensive or Gricean communication and the 80 
reiterated mutual perspective-taking that underlies this process has consequently been highlighted as a 81 
defining feature of human linguistic communication (e.g. Grice, 1982; Dennett, 1983; Sperber & 82 
Wilson, 1995; Sperber, 2000; Tomasello, 2008; Scott-Phillips, 2015b). 83 
 Given the proposed centrality of Gricean characterisations of communication (Grice, 1957) to human 84 
communicative interaction, questions have been raised as to the uniqueness of these aspects of human 85 
language. The extent to which human and non-human animal communication could involve the same 86 
underlying psychological framework has been debated (Gómez, 1994; Tomasello, 2008; Scott-Phillips, 87 
2015a, b; Moore, 2015a). One reason for this is that on standard accounts (Dennett, 1983; Sperber, 88 
2000), Gricean communication requires that communicators are capable of entertaining very complex 89 
metarepresentations – that is, representations of others’ mental states. Dennett (1983, 1988) played a 90 
critical role in initial attempts to operationalise animals as intentional systems by differentiating 91 
between various orders of the metarepresentational complexity that intentional communication 92 
requires, based on Grice’s analysis (Dennett, 1983). Zero-order intentionality attributes no mentality 93 
or intention to the communicative signalling of animals. First-order intentionality requires that the 94 
signaller intends to signal to produce a response in the recipient, but does not require that the recipient 95 
recognise this. Second-order intentionality involves complementing the intention to signal with the 96 
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attribution of mental states (by the recipient to the signaller); whilst third-order intentionality requires 97 
that the signaller intend for the recipient to attribute to her the intention to signal. Finally, fourth-order 98 
intentionality requires that signaller and recipient, alike, represent both the signaller’s goal and her 99 
intention that the recipient recognise that goal (Dennett, 1983; Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Scott-Phillips, 100 
2015a, b).  101 
Although this operationalisation would appear to serve as a useful guide to identifying what type of 102 
intentionality an animal communicative system displays, it has also generated problems related to 103 
what the levels of intentionality represent. As Dennett (1983) has noted, both first and higher orders of 104 
intentionality require that an act of signalling is produced voluntarily and in a goal-directed way. 105 
However, second-order intentionality (and beyond) likely employs cognitive mechanisms of a 106 
qualitatively different kind – since it requires that both signaller and recipient engage in some form of 107 
mental-state attribution. For this reason, second-order intentionality has received most interest because 108 
it has been generally considered as more ‘human’ or, as Grice highlighted, as more indicative of ‘true’ 109 
linguistic communication (Grice, 1957) and hence a step further along the continuum towards human 110 
language (Scott-Phillips, 2015b). One major consequence is that it has since become commonplace to 111 
assume that in order to demonstrate convincing evidence that animal vocal production is intentional 112 
and thus relevant to human language, at the very least, an attribution of mental states during vocal 113 
communication is required.  114 
This emphasis of mental-state attribution is unhelpful for two reasons. Firstly, whilst adult humans are 115 
competent at reiterated mental-state attribution, there is evidence that younger children find high 116 
orders of metarepresentation difficult (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Liddle & Nettle, 2006). Some 117 
workers in primate cognition have therefore argued that, if standard interpretations of Grice are right, 118 
then Gricean communication would be too difficult for both animals and human children. If this is 119 
correct, then standard interpretations must overstate the cognitive pre-requisites of Gricean 120 
communication (Gómez, 1994; Moore 2014, 2015a, b) – and human and animal communication may 121 
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share a common psychological framework after all. The less-intellectualised approaches to human 122 
communication are supported by the argument that even in adults, speech production and 123 
interpretation seems not always to require inference computation or belief ascription about speaker 124 
intentions (Millikan, 1984). Furthermore, experimental studies under controlled conditions have 125 
repeatedly demonstrated that mindreading is not deployed automatically during social and 126 
communicative situations (Keysar, Lin & Barr, 2003; Apperly et al., 2006) and is even sometimes 127 
impeded by the surrounding social environment (McClung, Jentzsch & Reicher, 2013). 128 
A second reason for resisting the mental-state attribution approach is that it risks obscuring the goals 129 
of comparative psychology and biology. The comparative approach does not aim to show that animals 130 
communicate in a way that fully equates to human communication; instead it aims to elucidate 131 
evolutionary precursors of crucial components of human language (Seyfarth, Cheney & Marler, 1980; 132 
Zuberbühler, 2005). The comparative study of semantics, for example, does not hinge on the 133 
discovery of symbolic conventions, displaced in time and space from the referents of communicative 134 
behaviour (Tomasello, 2008). In that case, to try to evaluate what other animals are doing by human 135 
standards is to risk failing to do justice to their abilities. A more theory-neutral approach to studying 136 
intentional communication would therefore be better.  137 
In line with this idea, over the last ten years various authors have taken a less theory-laden approach to 138 
intentionality. This approach sidesteps the requirement that intentional communication involves 139 
understanding the minds of others and does not assume that intentional use of communicative signals 140 
involves the sorts of ‘ostensive-inferential’ communication that thinkers in the Gricean tradition have 141 
argued characterises human communication. Through borrowing behavioural markers implemented by 142 
developmental psychologists to distinguish between reflexive and more intentional gestural 143 
communication in children (Bates et al., 1979), progress has been made in identifying traits that are 144 
precursors to distinctively human intentional communication systems (Leavens, Russell & Hopkins, 145 
2005; Liebal, Pika & Tomasello, 2006). In a similar way to humans, non-human primates, primarily 146 
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great apes, also communicate with each other by gesturing. Observations of the production of gestures 147 
suggest that they fulfil a number of the criteria specified for intentionality in communicative signals 148 
(Table 1). Individuals have, for example, been observed to take into account the attention state of the 149 
receiver, only gesturing when selected receivers are appropriately attentive (Leavens et al., 2005), and 150 
to elaborate or change the signal if their initial signal fails to reach the apparent goal (Cartmill & 151 
Byrne, 2007). By avoiding the question of mental-state attribution, and by focusing on behavioural 152 
markers of flexible and goal-directed communication, an array of studies have demonstrated first-153 
order intentionality in the communication of our closest living relatives (Call & Tomasello, 2007; Pika 154 
& Liebal, 2012; Byrne, 2016). 155 
However, some variation exists in the criteria of intentionality that individual studies apply to gestural 156 
signals and there have been few attempts to apply all criteria to a single signal in a study species (but 157 
see Leavens, Hopkins & Thomas, 2004). Moreover, each individual marker of intentionality in 158 
isolation can be explained through lower-level mechanisms, without needing to invoke intentionality. 159 
For example, sensitivity to the attention state of the receiver could simply be a learned discrimination 160 
where signals are only produced when a receiver’s face can be seen; persistence of a signal may have 161 
nothing to do with an intention to communicate with an as yet unresponsive receiver, but simply that 162 
signal production is emotionally driven and only when the goal is met does the underlying emotion 163 
change and terminate signal production (Liebal et al., 2013; Gaunet & Massioui, 2014; Savalli, Ades 164 
& Gaunet, 2014). Therefore, it is important, before invoking first-order intentionality, to demonstrate 165 
convergent evidence from a number of markers of intentionality for the same signal and species 166 
(Liebal et al., 2013; although see Vail, Manica & Bshary, 2013). Although multiple cases of 167 
converging evidence do not amount to a proof, the probability of a behaviouristic explanation 168 
decreases. 169 
Whilst gestural studies highlight potential phylogenetic precursors to the intentional communication of 170 
humans and provide crucial comparative data, similar evidence from vocal communication studies has 171 
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not been considered as equally convincing. Despite numerous attempts, researchers have failed to 172 
teach enculturated apes to produce spoken language (Yerkes & Yerkes, 1929: Hayes, 1951). As their 173 
vocalisations are commonly produced in specific contexts, it has been traditionally assumed that 174 
vocalisations are the product of low-level emotional processes and are best characterised as 175 
involuntary responses to specific stimuli rather than voluntary, goal-directed signals (Dennett, 1983; 176 
Notman & Rendall, 2005; Tomasello, 2008). Furthermore, invasive procedures have shown that call 177 
initiation in monkeys is mediated by limbic rather than cortical structures in the brain (Jürgens, 1992). 178 
On the other hand, some studies suggest that vocal and non-vocal sounds are used intentionally. Great 179 
apes use voiced and unvoiced sounds in a controlled manner that implies flexibility and intentionality 180 
(Russell et al., 2005; Hopkins, Taglialatela & Leavens, 2007, 2011; Hostetter et al., 2007). More 181 
recent studies, under natural conditions, have provided additional support for intentionality in ape 182 
vocalisations (Crockford et al., 2012; Crockford, Wittig & Zuberbühler, 2015; Schel et al., 2013). 183 
Moreover, multiple studies have shown vocalisations to be dependent on the surrounding social 184 
audience in a variety of species (Marler, Dufty & Pickert, 1986; Zuberbühler, 2008; Crockford et al., 185 
2012). These so called ‘audience effects’ are not solely due to simple, arousal-mediated, social 186 
facilitation effects (Zajonc, 1965), as might be the case when examining the presence or absence of 187 
conspecifics (Tomasello, 2008). Instead, they incorporate more subtle social and behavioural 188 
variations, e.g. relationship quality (Slocombe et al., 2010; Schel et al., 2013; Kalan & Boesch, 2015) 189 
or response of receivers (Wich & de Vries, 2006).  190 
Despite this body of data, the existence of intentional vocal communication in animals is still disputed 191 
(Tomasello, 2008). Given the central role intentionality plays in human language and the apparent 192 
disparity between the intentional production of gestures and non-intentional vocalisations in non-193 
human primates, it has been argued that language must have evolved via a gestural, rather than a vocal, 194 
route (Corballis, 2002; Tomasello, 2008). This theoretical reasoning certainly adds fuel to the fiery 195 
debate surrounding language’s evolutionary emergence. But unfortunately it fails to consider the fact 196 
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that the researchers working with gestures and vocalisations, respectively, are operating from different 197 
bases (Slocombe, Waller & Liebal, 2011). Animal vocal communication researchers are investigating 198 
how the production of vocalisations may or may not be used to influence the mental states of receivers, 199 
often with negative results (Rendall, Cheney & Seyfarth, 2000; but see Crockford et al., 2012; Schel et 200 
al., 2013). By contrast, gestural communication researchers are using an in-place suite of behaviours, 201 
derived from child developmental work, to address how goal-directed and hence intentional (Dennett’s 202 
first-order intentionality) gestural production is, predominantly in primates. This means that the 203 
research into vocalisations tacitly employs a more demanding criterion for intentionality than the 204 
research into gestures. As a result, comparing intentional production of animal signals at different 205 
levels in the two different modalities commits the mistake of not comparing like with like, and hence 206 
renders it difficult to draw reliable conclusions about differences in intentionality across these 207 
modalities.  208 
To resolve these conceptual and methodological difficulties we propose to ‘level the playing field’ 209 
with an updated framework in which the intentional nature of animal communication, irrespective of 210 
modality, can be operationalised and systematically assessed. A single-framework approach will 211 
facilitate direct comparative work amongst species and communicative mediums, providing a more 212 
holistic picture of the evolution of human intentional communication. 213 
 214 
II. THE NEW FRAMEWORK 215 
The framework that we propose consists of three distinct criteria, each of which needs to be met by a 216 
signal type before intentionality is ascribed to it. We do not abandon consideration of cognitive 217 
components to intentionality, but instead argue that questions about whether or not vocal 218 
communication is produced voluntarily and in a goal-directed way can be answered independently of 219 
questions about whether the signaller and receiver are engaged in mindreading. Therefore, we return 220 
to goal-directedness and its role in intentional behaviour as the first criterion requiring satisfaction. 221 
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 222 
Animal S intentionally communicates I to receiver R if the following three propositions all hold: 223 
 224 
(1) S acts with a goal with the content I 225 
Goal-directed behaviour has been a central focus of comparative psychology research over the last 226 
three decades. At a more rudimentary level the notion of goal-direction involves the role of motor 227 
processes organising action towards physical targets (Kenward et al., 2009). However, goal-228 
directedness has also been implicated in intentional behaviour, as opposed to automatic or habitual 229 
behaviour (Heyes & Dickinson, 1990). Here it is necessary to show that the goal-directed behaviour is 230 
based upon knowledge of the relationship that exits between the action and its consequences (Wit & 231 
Dickinson, 2009). Hence within our new framework we shift the cognitive emphasis to demonstrating 232 
that communication is goal-directed.  233 
Whilst we appreciate that operationalisation of goal-directedness is not straightforward, it is a far more 234 
tangible and relevant criterion than the demonstration of mental-state attribution. Previous studies 235 
probing the intentionality of primate gestures have emphasised the role of persistence and elaboration 236 
in identifying goal-directedness. In line with this, we argue that goal-directedness can be empirically 237 
investigated more generally by merging these criteria with the ide tification and application of 238 
‘stopping rules’ (Burkart, Roelli & Richiger, 2015). When a signaller possesses a goal for its 239 
communication, it would stop upon reaching the goal, but persist and/or elaborate the signal when the 240 
goal is not reached (Leavens et al., 2005). Thus, as with any other behavioural data, regular and 241 
reliable observations fulfilling the criteria (e.g. a goal-dependent cessation of communication, or 242 
indeed persistence and elaboration in the absence of the goal being met) are critical to demonstrating 243 
the presence of a goal, causally linked with the signal. Furthermore, experimental manipulation of goal 244 
end states leading to premature or delayed goal accomplishment is an additional, complementary way, 245 
to assess the causal link between the goal and the communicative signal. 246 
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 247 
(2) S produces voluntary, recipient-directed signals as a means to reach the represented goal 248 
We agree with Leavens et al. (2004) and Moore (2015b) that to show intentionality, behaviour must 249 
be under volitional control and recipient-directed. Criteria generated from studies of intentional 250 
communication in infants (Bates et al., 1979) represent a valuable set of measures to address these 251 
conditions (see Table 1). One indicator of voluntary control is selective use of the signal, and in 252 
particular, selectively producing or withholding a signal in response to social factors such as audience 253 
composition and behaviour (social use). As we highlighted above, social context could in principle be 254 
part of a complex stimulus to which an automatic, innate signal-production mechanism responds. Thus 255 
Hurford (2007, p. 232) argues that only if “circumstances under which calls are given are too 256 
implausibly complex to be hardwired into the genes” should we infer that these signals are voluntary. 257 
Indicators of the recipient-directed nature of a signal include social use, audience checking and 258 
sensitivity to attentional state (Ristau, 1991; Povinelli et al., 2003; Liebal, Call & Tomasello, 2004; 259 
Leavens et al., 2005; Schel et al., 2013). Every signal type and study species is different. So, whilst it 260 
has been suggested that the more criteria satisfied the greater the confidence that a signal is indeed 261 
intentional (Schel et al., 2013), this may not always be plausible (e.g. certain criteria apply only to the 262 
visual domain). Thus we would argue for a strict a priori selectio  procedure of criteria to ensure fair 263 
comparisons across species and modalities. 264 
 265 
(3) S’s signalling behaviour changes the behaviour of R in ways conducive to realising I 266 
As the last condition for intentionality, we focus on the behaviour of the receiver with respect to the 267 
signal produced. Given our shift of focus away from signaller or receiver mental-state attribution we 268 
only require that the communicative behaviour of the signaller elicits a change in the behaviour of the 269 
receiver. To rule out the pitfall of simply treating any behavioural change in the receiver as sufficient 270 
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for intentionality, we strengthen our condition by specifying that the change in the receiver’s 271 
behaviour must be repeatable, consistent and in line with the apparent intentions of the signaller.  272 
In order to demonstrate how our conditions can be operationalised, we below interpret data from a 273 
recent study on the alarm-calling behaviour of chimpanzees within the new framework and assess its 274 
intentionality. 275 
 276 
III. AN EXAMPLE OF INTENTIONALITY IN VOCAL COMMUNICATION ASSESSED 277 
WITH THE PROPOSED CRITERIA 278 
In a similar way to many primate and non-primate species, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes 279 
schweinfurthii) produce vocalisations when faced with dangerous situations (e.g. python or leopard 280 
presence, inter-group interactions). However, due to the rare occurrence of such signals, experimental 281 
manipulations are critical to assess rigorously the mechanisms underlying their production. Schel et al. 282 
(2013) exposed wild chimpanzees in the Budongo Forest, Uganda, to realistic moving snake models 283 
and recorded their vocal behaviour.  284 
In line with our framework, it is first critical to show that signallers exposed to model snakes signal 285 
with a goal with a particular content (I). To infer the goal of the signaller, Schel et al. (2013) 286 
investigated the cessation of alarm calling in chimpanzees. Theoretically, if the goal of alarm calling is 287 
to warn others, signallers should persist until all potential receivers are safe. By implementing an 288 
objective behavioural criterion of ‘safety’ Schel et al. (2013) demonstrate that signal cessation was not 289 
affected by the safety of the signaller, but instead occurred when receivers were safe (see also Wich & 290 
de Vries, 2006). When alarm calling stopped, receivers were significantly more likely to be safe than 291 
during the rest of the experimental trial.  292 
Secondly, standardised criteria implemented in developmental child intentionality studies must be 293 
applied to the signal to assess its voluntary nature and degree of recipient-directedness. Schel et al. 294 
(2013) showed that the production of certain types of alarm calls is influenced by the composition of 295 
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the social audience, as the arrival of friends but not non-friends in the area elicited an increase in the 296 
production of these calls. Furthermore, analysis of audience-checking behaviour, including gaze 297 
alternation, suggested that signallers monitor and potentially take into account the current behaviour of 298 
receivers when deciding to produce certain alarm calls. Hence chimpanzee alarm calls also appear 299 
recipient-directed. 300 
The third and final criterion requires that receivers of the signal must regularly respond in a way that is 301 
in line with the signaller’s presumed intentions. However, such a demonstration does not require that 302 
the receivers understand and represent the intentions of the signaller; and so does not imply any 303 
attribution of a mental state to the signaller by the recipient. Currently the data available from the 304 
study do not sufficiently satisfy this criterion, as Schel et al. (2013) did not directly explore the 305 
influence of alarm calling on the receiver’s behaviour. Nevertheless, certain observations do suggest 306 
that this condition may also have been satisfied. When hearing conspecific alarm calls, receivers have 307 
been observed to behave in a similar way as when they encounter predators naturally, including 308 
bipedal scanning behaviour and tree climbing (K.E. Slocombe, A. Schel, S. Townsend, Z. Machanda 309 
& K. Züberbuhler, unpublished data; Crockford et al., 2015; see also Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990). 310 
These behavioural observations suggest that the goal of the signaller, in terms of warning group 311 
members of a threat, has potentially been met. However, more systematic comparisons to baseline 312 
scanning behaviour indicating that the response was caused by the communicated content are still 313 
required. 314 
The above example of alarm calling in chimpanzees is not designed to demonstrate intentional 315 
communication. Instead, it simply serves to illustrate that the proposed framework for assessing 316 
intentional communication in animals is objective and realisable. Moreover, although there have been 317 
previous valuable attempts to operationalise intentionality (Leavens et al., 2005; Liebal et al., 2006; 318 
Vail et al., 2013; Hobaiter & Byrne, 2014) these have been predominantly restricted to a single 319 
modality (but see Hopkins et al., 2007), complicating multi-modal comparisons which are vital to 320 
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understanding intentional communication holistically. Our approach builds on existing work, but 321 
crucially bridges the current gap that exists between modalities through being applicable to any 322 
reliably and repeatedly observed communication signal. 323 
 324 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 325 
(1) The voluntary nature of human communication has long been considered a key, potentially unique, 326 
feature of human cognition and language. In light of this, much comparative research has attempted to 327 
unveil analogous or homologous forms of voluntary communication in animals as a way to understand 328 
better what features are really unique to language and from this how the language faculty may have 329 
evolved (Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch, 2002; Fitch, 2010). However, advances in the field have been 330 
complicated by the scarcity of convincing evidence of voluntary production of animal communication 331 
in the vocal domain (Wheeler & Fischer, 2012: Rendall & Owren, 2013; although see Crockford et al., 332 
2012). This gap in understanding has had far reaching impacts regarding the predicted evolutionary 333 
route via which language may have evolved, namely whether the origins of language were gestural or 334 
vocal.  335 
(2) We propose that the problem does not lie only in insufficient data. Additionally, it is bound up 336 
with a preoccupation with questions about whether voluntary communicative acts in animals are 337 
produced with the same sorts of cognitively complex intentions thought characteristic of human 338 
communication – in particular, the intention to modify the mental states of receivers. Although 339 
mental-state attribution and its role in mediating signal production is an important component of 340 
human intentional communication (Dennett, 1983; Crockford et al., 2012), we argue that focusing on 341 
this alone detracts from equally informative examples of behaviour. Moreover, the assumption that 342 
human communication must aim at changing mental states has been challenged (Moore, 2015a).  343 
(3) How widely distributed first-order intentionality is across the animal kingdom is a key question 344 
that must be addressed if we are to (i) understand the unique qualities of intentionality in humans, (ii) 345 
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shed light on the modality and evolutionary route via which language evolved, and (iii) understand 346 
more generally the adaptive benefit of intentional signalling in non-human animals. 347 
(4) Critically, we provide the necessary framework to address first-order intentionality, whether 348 
analogous or homologous, across modalities and species giving rise to a unified and unbiased 349 
understanding of the nature of intentional communication in animals.  350 
 351 
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Table 1. The criteria for intentional communication in animals pertinent to step 2 in the new 502 
framework. Amended from Schel et al. (2013).  503 
 504 
 505 
 506 
 507 
 508 
 509 
 510 
 511 
 512 
 513 
 514 
 515 
 516 
Criterion Explanation 
Social use The signal is directed at a recipient. This can be assessed at various 
levels: 
(1) Presence/absence of audience effect: the signal is only produced in 
the presence of a recipient. 
(2) Composition of audience: the signal is only produced in the 
presence of certain recipients (e.g. kin, dominants, friends) 
(3) Behaviour of audience: signal production is contingent on the 
behaviour of the recipient 
Sensitivity to 
attentional 
state of 
recipient 
Visual signals are only produced in the field of view of recipients. If 
signaller does not have a recipient’s visual attention, tactile or auditory 
signals should be produced. This can also be considered a social use 
level-3 audience effect. 
Manipulation 
of attentional 
state of 
recipient 
Before a visual signal is produced, attention-getting behaviours are 
directed towards a recipient who is not visually attending to the signaler 
or the signaller moves itself into the line of view of a recipient (Liebal et 
al., 2004). 
Audience 
checking and 
gaze 
alternation 
Signaller monitors the audience and visually orients towards the recipient 
before producing a signal. If a third entity is involved, gaze alternation 
may occur between recipients and this entity. 
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